Negotiators' cognition: An experimental study on bilateral, integrative negotiation by Reina, Livia
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Reina, Livia
Working Paper
Negotiators' cognition: An experimental
study on bilateral, integrative
negotiation
Dresden discussion paper in economics, No. 05/03
Provided in cooperation with:
Technische Universität Dresden
Suggested citation: Reina, Livia (2003) : Negotiators' cognition: An experimental study on
bilateral, integrative negotiation, Dresden discussion paper in economics, No. 05/03, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/48113Dresden University of Technology 







 Dresden Discussion Paper Series  








An experimental study 

























ISSN 0945-4829  




Technische Universität Dresden 
Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
































Faculty of Business Management and Economics, Department of Economics 
 
Internet: 
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded from the homepage: 
http://rcswww.urz.tu-dresden.de/wpeconomics/index.htm 




Working paper coordinators: 
Michael Berlemann 
Oliver Greßmann 
e-mail: wpeconomics@mailbox.tu-dresden.de  
 
 













  Livia Reina    
  TU-Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften    
  VWL, Lehrstuhl Managerial Economics   
 1062  Dresden 







Many negotiations offer a potential for integrative agreements in which the parties can maximize joint gains (through 
logrolling) without competing for resources as in a 0-sum game; nevertheless negotiators often fail to exploit this 
potential and settle for suboptimal, distributive agreements. In this study a situation of two-issues bilateral negotiation 
has been considered. Our aim is to get some insight on the causes that prevent negotiators from reaching integrative, 
Pareto-optimal agreements. We ran two experiments (one with policy makers and one with students) in which we tested 
the “fixed pie bias” of negotiators, and we introduced a new explanation for suboptimality, based on the hypothesis of a 










Negotiation has been defined as the process by which two or more parties attempt to resolve 
perceived incompatible goals (Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992).  
Many models derived from game and bargaining theory have treated almost exclusively the 
conflictual and distributive aspect of negotiation. The issues to be negotiated are considered as 
falling along a single dimension, with opposed positions at each end, and the dynamics are 
supposed to be largely restricted to making initial offers, making concessions and retractions, and 
eventually converging toward agreement or breaking off negotiations, without possibilities of 
expanding or redefining the bargaining space.  
The focus of negotiation research has recently been shifted from distributive bargaining theory 
toward the integrative bargaining approach which emphasises the importance of joint problem 
solving. “Many negotiations provide opportunities for integrative agreements in which the parties 
maximise their outcomes, or achieve greater resources, without competing with the other party in a 
direct win-lose fashion” (Thompson and Hastie, 1990a). Integrative analysis, rather than seeing a 
process that works from fixed points of discord to a common point of convergence, stresses the 
need to create new solutions by manipulating conceptualizations of the problem through a process 
of inventive and cooperative problem solving, so as to reconcile the interests of all parties and reach 
joint benefits, or attain “win-win” goals (Pruitt, 1986; Putnam, 1990; Brett et al., 1990; Fisher and 
Ury, 1991; Brett, 2000). The different parties are likely to have different interests, priorities, and 
resources, and these asymmetries frequently produce cross-cutting cleavages among actors and 
opportunities for tradeoffs among issues which could be positively exploited. The parties may be 
divided differently depending on the kind of issue to be negotiated. Parties may find that their 
enemy on one issue is their ally on others, so that simple concession-convergence bargaining 
becomes virtually impossible; there is no single dimension along which parties can converge. 
Moreover, a large number of parties enhances the possibility to form coalitions which may be used 
strategically by the parties to achieve their goals.  
A growing branch of integrative analysis focuses on precise mechanisms for identifying the best 
tradeoffs among the parties’ interests, and thereby insure the greatest optimality to the outcome 
(Zartman, 1999). This doesn’t mean that the distributive component of bargaining is completely 
eliminated from the negotiation process, but simply that the parties “can cooperate in order to 
change the pie that they eventually will have to divide” (Raiffa, 1982). 
There exist various techniques which are adopted in integrative negotiation: logrolling (or issue-
aggregation), issue-disaggregation, bridging, circular barter, cost cutting, nonspecific compensation 
(Touval, 1982; Brett, 1990; Hopmann, 1996). In order to limit our research we will focus our  3
attention on logrolling (see next section). Many negotiations offer a potential to maximize joint 
gains through logrolling; nevertheless negotiators often fail to exploit this potential and settle for 
sub-optimal, distributive agreements. Our aim is to run some experiments in order get some insight 
on the causes that prevent negotiators from reaching integrative, pareto-optimal agreements. In 
particular, our purpose is to test the already known “fixed pie bias” of negotiators (see next section) 
in a situation of two-issue bilateral bargaining, and to introduce a new, additional, explanation for 
suboptimality in integrative negotiation: a zone of agreement bias (ZAB) which is due to a 
satisficing and not optimizing behavior of negotiators. 
 
2. Logrolling and fixed pie bias 
The technique of logrolling consists in redefining the issues by aggregating them into interlocking 
issues. Sub-issues are linked together “to create package agreements out of components that would 
be nonnegotiable if treated separately” (Hopmann, 1996). This approach involves identifying 
interests, prioritising them, and creating tradeoffs in which parties concede on low-priority interests 
in order to receive satisfaction of high-priority interests (Brett et al., 1990). 
This approach is represented in Fig.1. On both issues the bargaining spaces of the parties don’t 
overlap, since the preference curves intersect below the line of neutrality or indifference. In a 
situation of distributive bargaining this would create a stalemate on both issues. However, if we 
consider that party 1 has stronger interests about issue 2 and is more neutral on issue 1, and party 2 
has stronger interest on issue 1 and is more neutral on issue 2, a solution can be found by agreeing 
to let party 1 win on issue 2, and party 2 win on issue 1. If party 1’s gains on issue 2 exceed its 
losses on issue 1, and party 2’s gains on issue 1 exceed its losses on issue 2, then both parties will 
still find the overall agreement beneficial. 
In order for logrolling to take place, and thus achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes, the parties should 
possess the cognitive capabilities required to represent and analyse the whole space of the 
negotiation problem. From the traditional point of view of rational-choice theory, which underlies 
most economic models, the problem of understanding the complexity of a problem would not 
subsist since the parties are considered to be able to construct complete and objective 
representations of reality. Under this approach the agents are assumed to possess perfect knowledge 
of the whole set of alternatives available to achieve their goals, and of the consequences that would 
flow from each of them, to have a well defined and stable structure of preferences over alternatives, 
to be driven by maximisation motives, to be endowed with unlimited computational ability, and to 
choose the tactics most likely to produce an optimal realisation of their goals. Under these  4
assumptions the parties would always be able to recognise and take mutually advantage of the 
integrative potential of negotiations. 
 
Figure 1  – Issue aggregation – 










Note: the utility curves U1 and U2 respectively of party 1 and 2 intersect below the horizontal line of indifference, thus 
the two parties don’t have a zone of agreement on neither issue. By aggregating the two issues (party 1 wins on issue 2 
and party 2 wins on issue 1) however, the two parties can both reach a convenient agreement. 
 
 
A large amount of empirical research (see for example Ho and Weigelt, 1996; Schotter et al., 1994; 
Selten, 1997; Legrenzi and Girotto, 1996; Zhang and Norman, 1994; Johnson-Laird, 1990; Ripps, 
1994; Evans and Over, 1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986;), nevertheless, has demonstrated that 
individuals don’t actually behave in such a perfectly rational way. When a complex problem 
situation arises, individuals are not able, because of their limited computational abilities, to develop 
an objective and complete representation of the problem; rather, they construct a subjective, 
simplified, partial, and sometimes even idiosyncratic, mental model of the situation, and then use 
this mental model to make projections and predictions about the future. As problem representations 
are generally prior to the generation of solutions, poor decision making and biases may derive not 
from the way preferences and alternatives are handled, but rather from the assumptions that underlie 
the generation, evaluation, revision, and selection among those preferences and alternatives. 
Research on negotiation has recently begun to focus attention on the study of how negotiators 
define and perceive a negotiation game. Experimental evidence has demonstrated that negotiators 
use various presumptions or simplifying strategies to interpret the situation and construct a 
response. As will be explained in more detail in the following, the more complex and ill-structured 
the negotiation problem, the more biased the negotiators’ representations.  
0 0 
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Bazerman (1983) suggested that negotiators’ mental models are subjected to the “fixed-pie bias”. 
They perceive negotiation as a purely distributive or competitive game in which there’s a fixed pie 
of resources to be divided up among the parties, and better outcomes for one can be obtained only at 
the expenses of another. Bazerman (1985) found that in a negotiation task with integrative potential, 
individuals concentrate first on competitive issues and it takes them significant experience to 
overcome the fixed pie bias and recognize the integrative potential of the situation. 
Hammond et al. (1975) suggest that negotiators frequently have poor and inaccurate perceptions of 
their opponents’ importance weights for multiissue conflicts. “The fixed pie assumption actually 
may derive from the presumption that the other party has the same concerns regarding the relative 
importance of the issues, thus eliminating the possibility for mutually-beneficial trades” (Carroll 
and Payne, 1991). This presumption is due to a social perception bias known as “false consensus 
effect”. It refers to the tendency of people to overestimate the proportion of other people who have 
interests similar to their own (Ross et al., 1977), and in negotiation it might result in distributive, 
win-lose perceptions of the task (Thompson and Hastie, 1990 b).  
Neale and Bazerman (1983) found that negotiators displaying a greater perspective taking ability 
obtained better results in a complex integrative bargaining exercise, suggesting that they might have 
been better at identifying those issues that were most valuable to their opponents than those with 
less perspective taking ability.  
Thompson and Hastie (1990) found that individuals enter negotiation situations with fixed-pie 
perspectives, and with the assumption that their interests are diametrically opposed to those of the 
other party. Negotiators who modify their fixed pie or zero-sum assumption by disclosing their 
preferences and searching for information about the other party’s preferences, do so immediately at 
the onset of the interaction; otherwise the fixed-pie assumption tends to persist throughout the 
negotiation. They showed that fixed-pie biases result in lower payoffs for the parties, because the 
latter fail to capture gains from integration. 
 
3. A new hypothesis to explain suboptimality 
In our research we hypothesise that, besides the fixed pie bias, there might exist an additional factor 
which could explain the suboptimality observed in integrative negotiation. This factor is represented 
by a “zone of agreement bias” (ZAB for simplicity) which might be due to the fact that negotiators 
behave in a satisficing, and not optimizing, way.
i In other words, we hypothesise that in a situation 
like the one described in figure 3, in which the bargaining spaces of the two negotiators overlap in 
both issues, negotiators explore only a limited part of the negotiation problem’s space, and, as soon 
as they are able to find a suboptimal solution falling within their zone of agreement, they stop  6
searching for the optimal solution falling outside of it, and remain blocked in the suboptimal one. 
To test our hypothesis, we compare negotiators’ behavior under two different treatments (A and B). 
Treatment A is the one described in Fig. 2, in which the bargaining spaces of the two negotiators 
don’t overlap in neither issue. Treatment B is the one described in Fig. 3, in which the bargaining 
spaces of the two negotiators overlap in both issues (see also next section). Our hypothesis is that 
the level of suboptimality will be higher when negotiators have a zone of agreement (treatment B). 
In this case indeed, it seems plausible to think that the possibility to find an agreement on the two 
issues separately, could prevent negotiators from exploring the space of more efficient agreements 
achievable through the aggregation of the two issues. Negotiators might remain blocked in the 
suboptimal agreements falling within the zone of agreement of each issue, and not consider the 
Pareto optimal ones falling outside of it. Negotiators under treatment A, in contrast, not being able 
to find a suboptimal solution, might be forced to consider the two issues jointly and eventually find 




Figure 2 – Treatment A – 
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Figure 3 – Treatment B – 








Note: the two parties have a zone of agreement (the bold line) on both issues.  
 
4. Experimental design 
The experiment has been run with 28 European policy makers and then it has been repeated with 28 
udergraduate students from the faculty of economics. Subjects were asked to take part in an 
experiment aimed at analysing negotiation behavior. They were randomly paired in couples. Seven 
couples were assigned to treatment A and seven couples to treatment B (see section 3). Each couple 
was asked to negotiate on two different issues that were simply identified with the value of two 
numbers. Each subject was given a sheet with two tables representing her incentive in the 
negotiation about the two issues. The first column of each table contained numbers from 0 to 10, 
representing the possible agreements on that issue, and the second column contained the points 
associated to each agreement. Subjects were requested to negotiate with their counterpart on one 
number from 0 to 10 in the first table and one number in the second table, in such a way to 
maximise their own total number of points (for instructions see appendix A). 
Within each couple a subject assumed the role of player one and the other the role of player two. As 
can be checked out in the payoff tables contained in appendix B, in each treatment for player one 
the higher the number the higher her payoff (both for the first and the second number) so that the 
best agreement from her standpoint is (10, 10). However, for player one the first number is “more 
important” than the second: the maximum that she can get out of it is 50 points and she loses 10 
points for each unit reduction, while the maximum that player one can get out of the second number 
is 10 points under treatment A and 20 points under treatment B, and she loses 3 points for each unit 
reduction. Actually, denoting by x and y the value of the first and, respectively, the second number, 
the payoff tables for player one have been obtained as follows: 
0 0 
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[1]  P1,A(x) = P1,B(x)= – 50 + 10 x  P1,A(y)= – 20 +3 y P1,B(y)= – 10 +3 y 
where P1,i(x) and P1,i(y) denote the amount of points under treatment i (for i = A, B) associated with 
x and, respectively, y. 
Player two preferences over the two numbers are induced in a symmetric way: she prefers smaller 
numbers to larger ones (the best agreement would be (0,0)), but the second number is now more 
important. Indeed, player two payoff tables are obtained from: 
[2]  P2,A(x) = 10 – 3 x   P2,B(x)= 20 – 3 x   P2,A(y)=P2,B(y)= 50 – 10y. 
This payoff assignment exactly reproduces the situation described in figures 2 and 3. Under 
treatment A the two players cannot both obtain a positive payoff on none of the single issue (i.e. 
there’s not a bargaining space on each single issue considered separately from the other). On the 
other hand, under treatment B if the first number is either 5 or 6, both players get a positive payoff 
on that issue and, similarly, if the second number is either 4 or 5 both gain out of it. 
In figure 4 is represented the space of all possible couples of agreements on issues 1 and 2 under 
treatment A. Along the line I1 we can find all the joint agreements inducing a total payoff of zero 
for player one (i.e. the equation of I1 is P1,A(x) + P1,A(y)= 0; furthermore, the arrow indicates the 
hemiplane containing agreements with a total payoff greater than zero. Similarly, I2 is defined by 
P2,A(x) + P2,A(y)= 0 and the arrow has a similar meaning. The region X contains all the possible 
agreements in which both players obtain a positive total payoff, and the bold line represents the 
Pareto frontier of such region. As we already know, under treatment A there are no joint agreements 
in which both players obtain a positive payoff on both issues. Region X represents then the 
bargaining space which emerges when the two issues are aggregated (through the logrolling 
mechanism). In particular in the agreement (10, 0) each player is winning on her most important 
issue and is losing on the other. In figure 5 is represented the space of all possible agreements on 
issues one and two under treatment B. Lines and arrows have here the same meaning as in figure 4 
but now we can also observe a new region (the box denoted by Z) containing those agreements in 
which both players obtain a positive payoff on each issue (and then a positive total payoff). It is 
worth noting that any agreement in the area Y Pareto dominates any other agreement inside Z. In 
particular at the point (10, 0), where each player wins on her most preferred issue and loses on the 
other, both players are better off. 
Negotiation was carried out face to face and subjects were allowed to speak freely. The only 
restriction was that they could not show their sheet with the tables to their counterpart. They had 
about 7 minutes to reach an agreement on the two numbers. If they didn’t find an agreement on one 
of the two numbers they got 0 points for that number.   9
As an incentive the policy makers were given an amount of gifts directly proportional to the number 
of points they obtained in the experiment. The students instead were paid a show-up fee plus an 
amount of money dependent on their performance in the experiment, i.e. directly proportional to the 
number of points they obtained.  
 
















Note: here is represented the space of all possible couples of agreements on issues 1 and 2 under treatment A. The 
region X contains all the possible agreements in which both players obtain a positive total payoff through logrolling, and 
the bold line is its Pareto frontier. 
 

















Note: here is represented the space of all possible agreements on issues one and two under treatment B. The region Z 
contains those agreements in which both players obtain a positive payoff on each issue singularly (and then a positive 
total payoff). Any agreement in the area Y Pareto dominates any other agreement inside Z. 
  10
5. Theoretical predictions 
The bargaining situation we are analyzing is characterized by incomplete information (actually, 
each player does not know the payoff tables of her counterpart). There is a very large strand of 
literature dealing with this topics and it is generally accepted that some kind of inefficiency will 
emerge in the final outcome even if agents are assumed to be fully rational. The particular nature of 
the inefficiency crucially depends on the specific rule that the agents have to follow in the 
bargaining process (the rule of the bargaining game), hence these models do not help us in making a 
specific prediction in a rule free bargaining situation like the one we are interested in. 
If we assume that individuals are not perfectly rational and are subjected exclusively to the fixed pie 
bias, we should expect that not all couples of subjects are able to reach a Pareto optimal agreement, 
and that the number of couples reaching a suboptimal agreement is the same in treatment B and A. 
If, as we hypothesise, individuals behave in a satisficing (not optimizing) way, and are subject to 
the ZAB, we should expect that not all couples of subjects are able to reach a Pareto optimal 
agreement, and that the number of couples reaching a suboptimal agreement under treatment B is 
higher than under treatment A. In particular the prediction is that the suboptimal agreements under 
situation B fall within the cartesian product of the two zones of agreement of each couple. Namely, 
we expect to observe a high proportion of agreements inside the region Z in figure 5.  
 
6. Experimental Results 
Hereafter, within each subject pool we will identify with letters from A to G the seven couples 
subjected to treatment A, and with letters from H to N the seven couples subjected to treatment B. 
Tables 1 – 4 show the experimental results that we obtained in the two subject pools. In order to 
interpret our results we will use figures 6 – 9 in which the same data sets are reported.  11
 
 
Table 1: experimental results of the policy makers 
  treatment A        treatment B   
Couple  1st N°  2nd N°  Time    Couple  1st N° 2nd N°  Time 
A  10  0 7   H  6 5 7 
B 9  1  7    I 10  0  7 
C 10  0  7    J 10  2  7 
D 4  5  5    K  NO  4  7 
E 10  0  4    L  4  7  7 
F 0  0  7    M 6  4  6 





Table 2: experimental results of the students 
  treatment A        treatment B   
Couple  1st N°  2nd N°  Time    Couple  1st N° 2nd N°  Time 
A  10  0 2   H  6 4 5 
B 9  1  2    I 6  4  3 
C NO  NO  5    J  5  4  3 
D 10  1  7    K  6  4  4 
E 10  0  4    L 10  0  5 
F 8  0  4    M  10  1  5 
G  10  0 2   N  10  0 5 
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Note: couples (K) and (N) found an agreement on the second (first) issue within the zone of agreement, and didn’t find 
any agreement on the first (second) issue. This means that they negotiated on the two issues separately, trying to find an 
agreement within their zones of agreement. 
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Note: couple (C) didn’t find any agreement on neither issue 
 


























Let’s consider first the pool of policy maker. As we can observe in figure 7, under treatment B only 
2 couples out of seven were able to reach the pareto frontier while the other five ended up with an 
inefficient outcome. In particular four of them remained blocked in the rectangular region which we 
previously denoted as region Z (couples K and N found an agreement on one issue within the 
bargaining space and didn’t reach any agreement on the other issue; this means that they negotiated 
on the two issues separately, trying to find an agreement within their zones of agreement). We 
ignore the results of couple L where player one obtained a loss because of a misunderstanding of 
the instructions.  
Under treatment A, we observe 3 couples reaching the efficient outcome (10, 0). Other two couples 
are quite close to the pareto frontier , while the results of couples D and F have to be ignored once 
more because of a misunderstanding of the instructions. The discrepancy between the results under 
treatments A and B seems to be significant so that the existence of a zone of agreement bias is 
actually compatible with our data. The main problem is, of course, the small size of our subject pool 
which doesn’t allow us to be completely confident with the reliability of our findings. However, we 
obtained a quite similar result in the other subject pool and that’s a good indication about the 
validity of our hypothesis. As we can see in figure 9, in the subject pool of students under treatment 
B, 4 couples remained blocked inside the bias region Z, while the other three were able to reach the 
pareto frontier. On the other hand, under treatment A (see figure 8) 5 couple reached an efficient 
outcome and couple B is quite close to the pareto frontier; only couple C was not able to find any 
agreement on neither issue.  
The discrepancy between the results under the two treatments is not negligible so that the ZAB 
seems to be at work under treatment B as in the previous subject pool. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The results of the experiments seem to confirm our initial hypothesis. The level of suboptimality 
has been higher under treatment B, i.e. when negotiators had a zone of agreement. Under this 
condition most of the negotiators (both policy makers and students) found an agreement on the two 
issues separately and remained blocked in the suboptimal agreements falling within the zone of 
agreement of each issue, without considering the Pareto optimal ones falling outside of it. 
Negotiators under treatment A, in contrast (with the exception of one couple of policy makers and 
one couple of students), have all negotiated on the two issues jointly and most of them have been 
able to find a Pareto optimal solution. 
These results confirm our hypothesis that, besides the fixed pie bias, there exists an additional factor 
which can explain the suboptimality observed in integrative negotiation. That is, negotiators are  15
boundedly rational individuals that behave in a satisficing (non-optimizing) way. They explore only 
a limited part of the space of the negotiation problem and, as soon as they are able to find a 
suboptimal solution, they stop searching for a Pareto optimal one. In a situation like the one 
considered in our experiments, this kind of behavior leads negotiators to a “zone of agreement bias” 
(ZAB), i.e. as soon as they find a suboptimal solution within their zone of agreement, they stop 
searching for Pareto optimal agreements falling outside of it. 
These findings should be confirmed by a more extensive analysis conducted on larger subject pools, 
but the indications emerging from our two pilot experiments allow us to be optimistic about the 
validity of our hypothesis. It could also be interesting to evaluate to what extent learning processes 
can reduce the level of suboptimality when agents can interact repeatedly. 
Another interesting development might deal with a situation of multi-issue multilateral negotiation 
with a potential for logrolling, in which decisions on each issue are made under majority rule. The 
aim would be to analyse to what extent negotiators are actually able to form an optimal coalition 
and reach an optimal agreement. Our hypothesis is that in certain situations the ZAB might induce 
negotiators to form suboptimal coalitions which lead to Pareto-dominated agreements. Negotiators 
indeed might be induced by the ZAB to form a winning coalition (on each issue separately) only 
with the parties with whom they share a zone of agreement, and not to explore the space of more 
convenient coalitions outside the zone of agreement.  16
Appendix A: instructions 
 
You are about to participate in an experimental study in decision-making and negotiation. The 
experiment will last for about half an hour. The instructions of the experiment are simple, and if you 
follow them carefully, you may win a lot of unique gifts and typical products from our region 
(money for students). Please, do not speak with the other player until the experiment starts.  
According to how you perform the gifts (money) will be delivered to you tomorrow. 
Please, write your name and the letter assigned to you for each period of experiment on the record 
sheet. 
 
Decisions and earnings: 
Everyone of you will be randomly matched with another participant. You have almost 10 minutes to 
gain as many points as you can. The number of gifts (the amount of money) will be directly 
proportional to the total number of points you will score in the experiment. Note that the amount of 
gifts (money) you will receive will be proportional to your own performance and not to the 
performance of the couple. At the beginning we assign you 50 points.  
 
What to do: 
As you see, you have a sheet with two tables, each made of two columns: in the left column you 
have a scale of numbers from 0 to 10. In the right column you have the number of points associated 
with each number in the left column. The tables of the other player might be different from yours. 
Your table and the points you get for each number of the left column is not known to the other 
player. Please, keep your tables secret. 
You have to negotiate with the other player in order to choose a number in the left column. You 
have to negotiate for 1 number in the first table (called “first number”) and 1 number in the second 
table (called “second number”). If you both agree write it in the record sheet and call a laboratory 
assistant. The total points you gain are the sum of the points you get from the agreement in each 
table. If you do not agree, you remain with your initial points. 
Please, note that you can agree with the other player on the “first number” and not on the 
“second number” and vice versa. In this case you will get the points corresponding to the 
number on which you agreed and you will get 0 points for the number on which you didn’t 
agree. Of course you can agree on both or neither. 
During the negotiations you can speak freely with the other player but you must not show your table 
to the other player.  17
 
Appendix B: payoff tables 
Treatment A 
Player one  Player two 
1st N°  points  2nd N°  points  1st N°  points  2nd N°  points 
0 -50 0 -20 0 10 0 50 
1 -40 1 -17 1  7  1 40 
2 -30 2 -14 2  4  2 30 
3 -20 3 -11 3  1  3 20 
4  -10  4 -8 4 -2 4 10 
5 0 5 -5 5 -5 5 0 
6 10 6 -2 6 -8 6  -10 
7 20 7  1  7 -11 7 -20 
8 30 8  4  8 -14 8 -30 
9 40 9  7  9 -17 9 -40 
10 50 10 10 10 -20 10 -50 
 
Treatment B 
Player one  Player two 
1st N°  points  2nd N°  points  1st N°  points  2nd N°  points 
0 -50 0 -10 0 20 0 50 
1 -40 1 -7 1 17 1 40 
2 -30 2 -4 2 14 2 30 
3 -20 3 -1 3 11 3 20 
4  -10  4 2 4 8 4  10 
5 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 
6  10  6 8 6 2 6  -10 
7 20 7 11 7 -1 7 -20 
8 30 8 14 8 -4 8 -30 
9 40 9 17 9 -7 9 -40 
10 50 10 20 10 -10 10 -50  18
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in a satisficing way. The term satisfice, a synonym of the term satisfy, has been introduced by Simon (1956) for this 
special use.  
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